Why the huge disparity between Soviet and German losses on the Eastern front?

[Guttersnipe]

As everyone else said, the Soviets pretty much just threw hordes of infantry at the Axis and relied on sheer weight of numbers to succeed!

I also see in that photo collection that they've put in the 'retouched' pictures of the soldiers on the roof of the Reichstag, omitting the many wristwatches which had been acquired by the Soviets!

The most visually telling reason for massive Soviet losses is presented at the beginning of the Jude Law movie, "Enemy at the Gates". There weren't enough rifles for every infantryman, and the ones who lacked were told to charge anyway, pick up the gun of the next person to get killed, and keep on charging.

You all realize that these statements have little basis in historical fact, right? The factual errors in Enemy at the Gates are far too numerous to go so into here.

The notion that the war on the eastern Front was won through human wave assaults is a fallacy perpetuated during the cold war. There were instances when attacks, like the one depicted in the fore mentioned film took place, but they were rare, and generally punitive in nature (e.g. if a unit retreated without orders, they would be ordered to retake positions at all costs).

A lot of the basis for the myth that the Soviets won the war by throwing "hords" of infantry at the Germans comes from German accounts of the period. Our traditional view of the Soviet army in the West is that of a clunky, unsophisticated rabble, however, at the strategic level, time and time again the Soviets out foxed the Axis with large tactical troop movements.

The pincher attack in the Caucuses that cutoff 6th Panzer Army was carried off by pulling troops off the line throughout the rest of the front, took months to build up, and went undetected by Axis intelligence; in the wake of the successful encirclement the German high command was left with the impression that the Soviets had overwhelmed them with numbers when, in actuality, the Soviets had bluffed them in other areas in order to establish a localized superiority of force. . .

 

[dr greg]

Well I'm not sure about that, I read a biography of Zhukov which said that when he cut his teeth in the battles of Khalkin Gol he was criticised for precisely that tactic, but because the Japanese were so thoroughly demoralised by it, they signed a peace deal that kept Russia's back door safe so to speak, Stalin promoted him, and the 'shock and awe' approach remained part of his strategy ever after....

 

[MikeBravo]

The "human wave" worked well for Japan at the start of the war. Unfortunately for them, the Allies developed counter-strategies that made it largely ineffective. The Japanese were not able to readjust to the change.

A lot of myths develop through the "fog of war" when the full story is not known

 

[Guttersnipe]

Zhukov's first victory as an army commander was indeed at Khalkin Gol, however, I would say that he cut his teeth there per se. He was a senior NCO and veteran of WWI when he joined the Red Army in 1917, later he was a battalion then regimental commander during he Russian Civil War. Zhukov, like so many senior Soviet commanders, came from the cavalry, but unlike so many of them, he was a proponent of armored warfare from the early 30's on. I would agree that Khalkin Gol became the template on which Zhukov based future tactics, however, if you do a closer inspection of the campaign, it becomes apparent that "shock and awe" by frontal assault was not one of them.

The offensive was initiated by a massive air and artillery bombardment in support of a conventional infantry assault, however, these were diversionary moves meant to mask his real intent -- two simultaneous combined arms flanking movements -- which succeeded in cutting the Japanese supply lines and ultimately forcing a withdrawal. The Soviet casualties were greater than those of the Japanese, but that's hardly surprising since the were on the offensive; the Soviets suffered about 23,000 casualties to the Japanese’s 19,000 – which is not bad ratio considering Zhukov’s Mongolian Army was charged with dislodging some of the most tenacious infantry in the world from prepared positions.

 

[Story]

Arguably because of four main factors: leadership, tactics, weaponry and (initially) quality of troops.

Ding!

The late 1930s saw the so-called Purges of the Red Army Cadres, which occurred concurrently with Stalin's Great Purge of Soviet society. In 1936 and 1937, at the orders of Stalin, thousands of Red Army officers were dismissed from their commands. The purges had the objective of cleansing the Red Army of the "politically unreliable elements", mainly among higher-ranking officers. This inevitably provided a convenient pretext for the settling of personal vendettas or to eliminate competition by officers seeking the same command. Many army, corps, and divisional commanders were sacked, most were imprisoned or sent to labor camps; others were executed. Among the victims was the Red Army's primary military theorist, Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, perceived by Stalin as a potential political rival. Officers who remained soon found all of their decisions being closely examined by political officers, even in mundane matters such as record-keeping and field training exercises.[72] An atmosphere of fear and unwillingness to take the initiative soon pervaded the Red Army; suicide rates among junior officers rose to record levels.[72] Most historians believe that the purges significantly impaired the combat capabilities of the Red Army. However, the extent of the consequential damage attributable to them is still debated.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Army

You haven't lived, until you've served under a full bird Colonel or a General who can't make a decision to save his own life.

 

[Chas]

The late 1930s saw the so-called Purges of the Red Army Cadres, which occurred concurrently with Stalin's Great Purge of Soviet society.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Army

You haven't lived, until you've served under a full bird Colonel or a General who can't make a decision to save his own life.

Beat me to it, bro. Not sure why it wasn't referred to earlier. The officer purges of the '30s drastically cut the Red Army's effectiveness. They were horribly unprepared for war, and had their butts handed to them by the Finns in the Winter War, which demonstrated to Hitler that the Red Army was beatable.

It wasn't until Stalin curbed the power and influence of the Commissars in the Red Army that morale and overall effectiveness could improve, and improve it eventually did.

To expand upon Story's point....

Even during the war, many generals, staff officers and who knows how many others were shot for not achieving objectives? Nothing is worse than serving under a man who knows that if he doesn't take that hill, he could get shot. If he knows that he could get shot for not getting the results that HQ wants, then what do you suppose is the value to him of the lives of the men under his command?

Butkus.

 

[MPicciotto]

I'm reading an interesting book right now published in 1943, the author was a correspondent in Berlin up until hostilities with the US. He watched Germany being bled dry by the Russian campaign. His book basically tells the story of how Russia destroyed Germany just by virtue of consuming so many resources of that nation. From potatoes to railroad engines. The rate of attrition was incredibly high and he tells how the Berliners in late 1941 were already demoralized by the conflict.

Matt

 

[dr greg]

Zhukov's first victory as an army commander was indeed at Khalkin Gol, however, I would say that he cut his teeth there per se. He was a senior NCO and veteran of WWI when he joined the Red Army in 1917, later he was a battalion then regimental commander during he Russian Civil War. Zhukov, like so many senior Soviet commanders, came from the cavalry, but unlike so many of them, he was a proponent of armored warfare from the early 30's on. I would agree that Khalkin Gol became the template on which Zhukov based future tactics, however, if you do a closer inspection of the campaign, it becomes apparent that "shock and awe" by frontal assault was not one of them.

The offensive was initiated by a massive air and artillery bombardment in support of a conventional infantry assault, however, these were diversionary moves meant to mask his real intent -- two simultaneous combined arms flanking movements -- which succeeded in cutting the Japanese supply lines and ultimately forcing a withdrawal. The Soviet casualties were greater than those of the Japanese, but that's hardly surprising since the were on the offensive; the Soviets suffered about 23,000 casualties to the Japanese’s 19,000 – which is not bad ratio considering Zhukov’s Mongolian Army was charged with dislodging some of the most tenacious infantry in the world from prepared positions.

What I meant by "shock and awe' was exactly what you describe: heavy artillery and air attack followed by direct infantry frontal assault, which by necessity meant that casualties were heavy in those troops, and his willingness to accept that as a tactical factor became characteristic of his later campaigns.
I also read a Japanese viewpoint that said that even they were surprised by the apparent willingness of the Russians to take such high casualties in that manner. In light of their later use of human wave attacks one wonders whether any lessons were learnt.

 

[TM]

Another contributing factor may be that the Soviets considered captured Russian soldiers to be traitors. Soldiers were expected to fight or die. There were repercussions even to the families of captured soldiers. This may have lead to increased Russian casualties.
Tony

 

[Bonneville]

One other point to consider; the Russian high command and politburo were the only ones capable of producing information on casualty numbers and it was in Russia's political interest to magnify these numbers to illustrate the contribution they made towards final victory further legitimizing and strengthenng their hand at the post war negotiating table. This point is merely conjecture.

 

[CigarSmokePhilosopher]

nazi soldiers were superior soldiers.

the end.

better than brits, americans, french, russians, japanese, everyone.

the social structure under the third reich completely revolved around genetic and warfare superiority. trained from a young age (think hitler youth), heavy training, ample time to prepare, confidence (they thought they were the elite race of the world and acted/fought as such), and strong (if insane) leadership. physically superior as well, in most cases- the schools had physical training for up to 3 hours daily.


we're very lucky to have won that war, and if anyone thinks otherwise they are a fool. Special thanks to the tens of millions of soviets who died stopping them. without that huge wall of losses we no doubt would have lost. I've always wondered why in the hell hitler turned on the soviets, especially so soon.

 

[CigarSmokePhilosopher]

i suppose one could argue this with the fact that we developed atomic capability first, but only with the help of german scientists. we lucked out here as well

 

[HungaryTom]

Why the huge disparity between Soviet and German losses on the Eastern front?

Stalin set up a system that can be compared to the teeth of a shark growing in rows. Previous rows to be substituted by the new ones. Older cadres had to live in constant fear being substituted by the new generations rising to take the positions. See Tsarist Ochrana, turning into Tcheka, than to GPU than to KGB. It wasn’t just the names that were exchanged.
1938 Great Purge was one major cleansing wave where generals and marshals were executed. Tuchachevskij was the most talented of those all - he had to perish. Stalin did a favor to his enemy - decapitating his own fighting machine. Voroshilov was a locksmith, Budjenny was a "good comrade" Cossack cavallerist from 1917/21 but nothing like Zhukov, who was "discovered" later and fell from grace. Contra-selection prevailed. See the failure of Soviets vs. Finland 1940 when they were far more numerous.

The other is that Stalin trusted too much on his Molotov-Ribbentropp pact and ignored warnings of several of his master spies that informed him about German invasion IN ADVANCE.

Disproportionately huge losses occurred in this first phase of war when entire Soviet Armies were encircled and annihilated and Soviets had to struggle first with the establishment of new industrial centers in the Urals and beyond. The lend and lease and the tech transfer from the US helped here a lot. As with the progress of war the disproportion in losses turned slowly and than always quicker and quicker in favor of the Soviets. It took time to get the right leaders in place, to get the right training, the arms etc.

Restructuring the army while fighting the most powerful attack couldn't happen within months - it took a few years to get a 10 million army. Also the weaponry of 1939 could not be compared with 1944/45. On the other side Nazis had prepared all the way since 1933 uninterrupted for this war(no killing of Generals - only after the bombing of Hitler). Their economy was hailed by western observers how nicely they eliminated unemployment. They also eliminated political enemies inside. Than they continued to eliminate others outside.

Technological superiority of Germans was clearly prevailing initially. Tanks had radios, could communicate with Stuka dive-bombers, giving integrated action of Air Force, and Land Forces.

Bolsheviks were ruthless vs. several populations social stands, religions etc. "Humans are the supreme value" this was echoed all the time but in fact they were expendables. Therefore no wonder how so may soviet citizens joined German armies. Annexed states i.e. Baltic states had entire divisions they gave to Germany. Same goes for Cossacks and Central Asian people. They joined since Bolsheviks made genocide vs. them since 1917. No worries, after allied victory Stalin annihilated all those collaborators; there weren't Vlasov and Kaminski-Brigade POWs. Bandera led resistance vs. Bolsheviks in the Ukraine decades AFTER WW2.

Germans had Wehrmacht generals, elite people in the top military leadership, selected from soldier families having a general militarist culture and high level of professionalism and education (Guderian, Manteuffel, Rommel, Rundstedt, Bittrich etc.). Later elements of this traditional military clashed with Nazis even in form of bombing attempts, but Hitlers fate was to survive until the complete and total loss.
Nazis built "politically reliable forces" however supreme military leadership was kept till the end by Wehrmacht generals i.e. the Prussian elite, see Keitel and Jodl, and Dönitz/Navy while on the low end of command, NCOs were trained in a way that they could accomplish the mission even if the officer was killed or severely wounded; there was a flexibility.

It was a miracle that Germans could get so far with such limited resources as they got- there is not a single oil field in Germany, just coal and iron. Also that Germany never came close to the Allies in terms of Navy (just the U-Boots) and they were never close in Air Force (no long range bombers, and than the Allied production quickly outnumbered them), basically they were strong in Ground Forces. They knew they must hit first and risk a lot since the rest of the world is much bigger than they are and every minute is working against them. They had 66 million Germans + Axis allies vs. a world of 2000 million to be conquered. The only slight chance for winning in this situation is to hit like a lightning and do it while the other is not yet prepared. Blitz. Like Skorzeny put it - target directly the head- and he really planned political assassinations, like Churchill's or Tito's. This is why this topic is so much discussed still today. Like a near miss of an earth orbit crossing asteroid.

German Blitz worked in countries with road networks similar to what was the norm in Germany, see France or the Benelux states. In Russia they never found this, which was getting worse and worse as autumn rains turned everything into a sea of mud and than came "Gen. Winter"; minus 40 Celsius blizzards. Another reason for Nazi failure.

The hubris and arrogance of Nazi leadership made so many errors that local populations quickly realized what kind of slavery they will have under Nazi Rule.

Stalin mobilized the own people with ideals that were absolutely taboo before; patriotism, RELIGION etc. This worked. Also add the psychological momentum of a nation fighting a homeland defense war - totally different motivation from a foreign war where you can hardly spell the names of the locations you fight at. However if the Soviet Union wasn't so big Stalin would have failed.

Hitler and his top heads wanted parallel organizations (quasi private centres of power) so everybody felt being observed striving for best possible performance to prove it to the boss. However parallels did hamper efficiency. Example: special forces were existent in the Wehrmacht (Brandenburg) than still they set up Skorzeny's SS commandos, and wasted the Brandenburg as common infantry unit.

Germany had brilliant scientists however Nazi occultists deployed charlatans at the same time as well. Hörbiger's fire and ice cosmology predicted that there will be a mild winter, so no substantial winter clothing is needed. Which wasn't the case. However Hitler listened to him, which made the entire Axis contingency freeze during winter 1941/42 they desperately collected winter garment back home.

Nazis had the idea of a quick war, surprise and playing va banque in general vs. the world. They were really successful till a point in time, seeing the world has allowed them to arm, than to occupy, than the Anschluss, than they rolled over Poland, than came the unbelievable Western Front success etc., etc. This boosted their egos.The trees ain't grow till the skies, and so this chain of success had to end. This is where ALL past, present and future conquerors of this world fail, they never know where and when to stop. The rest of the world never wanted to allow Nazis to conquer them - extremely quick and aggressive force. 1933-1938 five years armament, conquests etc. 1939-1945 Six years world war.

Churchill ended the policy of appeasement and wiped away the appeasers. The game was namely not about evening out mistakes made at the Versailles treaty... Germany did have a bunch of miracle weapons - they were existent in the heads of scientists and were realized. Luckily a bit later; jet fighters, intercontinental ballistic weapons, landing on the moon.

The other factor was that Nazis had this irrealistic hatred vs. Jews, stamping the achievements of Jewish intellect as a humbug. Blinding hatred. Remember that many Jewish scientists were trained in Germany or they went to Germany for training since the science & technology was the most advanced in the early 1900s, (see the number of Nobel prize winners in natural sciences, coming from Weimar Germany) but than saw what is developing politically and emigrated. So the Jewish scientists and other emigrants weren't working for Nazi success but for the Allies and made the A-Bomb reality.

Hitler's hubris stopped the development of German long distance bombers, missiles, which could have lead to a victory.

Nazi leaders also ignored British weapons - Spitfires, than also Skorzeny wrote memoires that he had to demonstrate the Sten MP with silencer illegally since top leadership never allowed their deployment. Same was for PPS Soviet machine guns - German soldiers used those a lot, although their weapons were officially "superior".

Germany fought a fierce War vs. the World in 1914/18 still the Emperor was just exiled, since this struggle didn't include industrialized genocide using railroad networks, barcode pre-computers etc. And yes the people perished in the death camps. Nazis were treated like outlaws and rightfully.

Nazis not only killed Jews, and other nations they detested or Soviet POWs turned into slave laborers, but ultimately the own nation as well - putting their biological elite in elite units suffering highest losses. Than came the ethnic Germans whom they also deployed. Than the auxiliary nations too. Than the child soldiers and Grandparent soldiers. Cannon fodder. They weren't making halt in front of nobody - if that prolonged ther reign a bit. It is better that this system perished. There wasn't anything golden about this.

 

[Widebrim]

nazi soldiers were superior soldiers.

the end.

better than brits, americans, french, russians, japanese, everyone.

the social structure under the third reich completely revolved around genetic and warfare superiority. trained from a young age (think hitler youth), heavy training, ample time to prepare, confidence (they thought they were the elite race of the world and acted/fought as such), and strong (if insane) leadership. physically superior as well, in most cases- the schools had physical training for up to 3 hours daily.


we're very lucky to have won that war, and if anyone thinks otherwise they are a fool. Special thanks to the tens of millions of soviets who died stopping them. without that huge wall of losses we no doubt would have lost. I've always wondered why in the hell hitler turned on the soviets, especially so soon.

Without making blanket statements, how would you "generally" compare Nazi soldiers from the beginning of the war to those towards the end? And how about Japanese soldiers? The triad of culture/government/military also produced an attitude of cultural superiority, and often blind devotion to emperor, that greatly affected their fighting power, as especially witnessed on Attu and Okinawa.

 

[CigarSmokePhilosopher]

Without making blanket statements, how would you "generally" compare Nazi soldiers from the beginning of the war to those towards the end? And how about Japanese soldiers? The triad of culture/government/military also produced an attitude of cultural superiority, and often blind devotion to emperor, that greatly affected their fighting power, as especially witnessed on Attu and Okinawa.

i wont pretend to be an expert on japanese soldiers of the period as i have shot many of them in video games but studied them little. i do study the third reich often as i found the whole thing fascinating if horrifying. i'm hard-pressed to avoid a blanket statement and make a "general" statement at the same time but I will say this: Towards the end of the war the german war machine was much less effective due to less experienced replacement man-power, under-aged soldiers, lessened morale, and waning abilities of the leadership- not to mention their forces were spread very thin.

For an example of this, during the Russian push into Berlin, the Third Reich's defense consisted of many old, sick, and young (including numerous hitler youth squads) defenders against over 2 million Soviet infantry, and upwards of 100,000 tanks, vehicles, and aircraft. The basic summation to be made here is that Adolf "bit off more than he could chew." In my opinion, hitting the Soviets lost him the war.

If he had kept the Soviets on his side, at least LONGER than he did, Hitler would have spared himself a few million casualties and at the same time added tens of millions of allied soldiers to his cause via the Soviet forces. This would no doubt have tipped the war in his favor if for no other reason than being able to concentrate his forces to the east moreso than worrying about a Soviet re-excursion into German-controlled territories.

 

[Chasseur]

A lot of the basis for the myth that the Soviets won the war by throwing "hords" of infantry at the Germans comes from German accounts of the period. Our traditional view of the Soviet army in the West is that of a clunky, unsophisticated rabble, however, at the strategic level, time and time again the Soviets out foxed the Axis with large tactical troop movements.

I have to second Guttersnipe here. Our understanding of WWII, and in particular the effectiveness of the German Army (the Heer) in relation to other armies has become much more advanced in the past 20 or so years. One thing you have to keep in mind is that much of our earlier understanding of the superiority of the Germans has to do with Cold War context of the 1950s. Many former German officers wrote pretty biased and at times quite self-serving memoires after the War (Guderian's stands out here in particular) and these interpretations were often taken at face value in the West. This line of thinking was also helped by a political need in the 1950s to rehabilitate the re-armament of Germany as a Cold War ally against the Soviet Union. So the myths of the incompetent Red Army and invincible Germany army (that was also pure from any Nazification or atrocities) were promulgated. This is not to say the Heer was not a very efficient fighting force, but in the past many authors have exaggerated its fighting skills, and denigrated skills of the US and Soviet Armies.


I would recommend the work of Russell Hart here, in particular “Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won at Normandy” on a comparison of how the US army in 1944 actually adapted better during the Normandy campaign than the Heer.
Karl-heniz Frieser “The Blitzkrieg Legend” while dealing with 1940 is also quite instructive in terms of getting a more realistic picture of the Heer.

For the Red Army the work by David Glantz (“When Titans Clashed” etc.) is well recommended.

 

[Guttersnipe]

One other point to consider; the Russian high command and politburo were the only ones capable of producing information on casualty numbers and it was in Russia's political interest to magnify these numbers to illustrate the contribution they made towards final victory further legitimizing and strengthenng their hand at the post war negotiating table. This point is merely conjecture.

Actually, the opposite is true, if you look at the "official" figures released at the time the Soviet military and political leadership tended to understate their losses by, sometimes, MASSIVELY significant amounts for morale purposes. Afterall, it's rather hard to explain to the public in Pravda why/how a casualty ratio of 2 - 2 1/2:1 was a considered a victory at Stalingrad. . .

nazi soldiers were superior soldiers.

the end.

better than brits, americans, french, russians, japanese, everyone.

the social structure under the third reich completely revolved around genetic and warfare superiority. trained from a young age (think hitler youth), heavy training, ample time to prepare, confidence (they thought they were the elite race of the world and acted/fought as such), and strong (if insane) leadership. physically superior as well, in most cases- the schools had physical training for up to 3 hours daily.


we're very lucky to have won that war, and if anyone thinks otherwise they are a fool. Special thanks to the tens of millions of soviets who died stopping them. without that huge wall of losses we no doubt would have lost. I've always wondered why in the hell hitler turned on the soviets, especially so soon.

You should read up on Soviet society. It was just as highly militarized and indoctrinated as that of the Third Reich. One of the key features was state sponsored marksmanship programs for youth, wrapped up in in the guise of healthy outdoor activity, that were, in fact, military fieldcraft and sniper training. The cult of personality surrounding Lenin/Stalin and the indoctrination of the population in regards to Marxist-Leninism, combined with nascent Russian nationalism, was just was pervasive in Stalin's USSR as it was in imperial Japan or Nazi Germany.

The notion that German soldiers were inherently "superior" is, frankly, part of the culture of what I like to call Panzer Porn. . .

. . . when you're talking about people willing to turn themselves into human weapons/bombs, murder civilians/POW's while taking "holiday"photos of the event or go into battle with three rounds of ammo and a sharpened shovel, it's all horrifying and shows to awful depths these nightmare states were able to push people to!

 

[kampkatz]

Some really fascinating exchange of knowledge and/or ideas here. One can learn a lot about WW2 by reading such information. Sadly, human nature never seems to evolve into a peace loving attitude, above all else.

 

[Widebrim]

Some really fascinating exchange of knowledge and/or ideas here. One can learn a lot about WW2 by reading such information. Sadly, human nature never seems to evolve into a peace loving attitude, above all else.

I agree with all your points.

 

[cookie]

During the war on the Eastern front, in terms of quality of weaponry there was not a huge disparity. In terms of quantity, after 1942 the Soviets had an advantage that grew as the war continued. Yet even excluding their defeats during the first few months of the German invasion, Soviet army's losses were several times those of the Germans. As specifically as you can, please identify and explain why.

In 1941 the Germans took about 3 million Soviet soldiers prisoner after the initial success of Barbarossa. They then allowed most of them to starve to death in prison camps or usd them in their various 'experiments' or simply mudered them in the camps by various means.