Battle of the Atlantic/Merchant Marine

[Norumbega]

Interesting. Common sense dictates that the easiest solution to the piracy problem was in putting an armed guard aboard, and indeed someone had suggested a new role for Blackwater.
The truth of the matter (being stranger than fiction) is that merchant vessels are not permitted to man crew served weapons of any sort, nor carry automatic weapons....or weapons of any kind for that matter, due to sovereignty rules which ban all weapons aboard vessels in territorial waters.
The solution to piracy seem so obvious, but alas. [huh]

I'll return with the story. Thanks.

 

[Norumbega]

HX-230 left New York harbor for the safety of Halifax, Nova Scotia, where it would lie at anchor before getting underway on it's most dangerous leg of the journey. SS William P. Frye was scarcely a month off the skidway and subsequent shake down cruise before joining the fleet.
Waiting for them were Admiral Doenitz masterful uboats, strung across the well trodden travel lanes. Wherever ships or convoys pierced the line, the radio signal would go out, and the wolf pack would descend upon it's prey in attack groups. The strategy was simple. There were those uboats who trailed, while the others sped ahead to lie in wait for the opportunity to fire off a spread of torpedoes, or in cases of larger groups they would attempt encirclement.

In early March, the ON convoys (Liverpool to New York) were taking a beating at the hands of the packs, losing twenty in those operations. The wolf packs could contain anywhere from 15 uboats on up and when combined into large groups, as many as 30 or more. Then there were the names:
Neptun & Burggraf, Waldfang, Ostmark, Neuland, Westmark, and Raubgraf, Seewulf, and Seeteufel to name a few.

It was a dangerous game of cat and mouse....uboats hunting and sinking their prey while subject to the convoy escorts which spewed out it's dangerous array of depthcharges, and of late, a newer and more effective threat in the form of long range reconnaissance & escort aircraft like the new Sunderland, capable of dropping depth charges from above. An interesting sound byte can be gathered from a brief example of one such action involving HX-228 and uboat sub groups Raubgraf and Neuland:

Neuland - HX 228.
HX 228 had passed safely to the south of Raubgraf when she sailed into the Neuland area, Hunger (U-336), who had been ordered on the 7th to join the southeast end of Neuland, sighted the convoy at 1335/10 in 50°27'N - 31°15'W. Neuland was of course immediately ordered to operate at maximum speed. On 13 March, when the operation was discontinued, the score stood at four to two, the U-boats having sunk four ships, one of which was HMS Harvester. Harvester sank U-444 (Langfeld) before she was sent down by U-432 (Eckhardt), which in turn was sunk by FFS Aconit.

Accounts of mid-March successes & failures.

The HyperWar offers one of the best accounts of the malestrom that convoy HX-230 and the SS William P. Frye was sailing into. Though lengthy, it sets the tone far better than I could ever hope to.

"Group Neuland's contact on HX 228 is a good example of radio intelligence difficulties at this time - the Germans having introduced a stiff cipher change on 1 March. On the basis of past U-boat behavior as seen in traffic read, a message of 27 February ordering 8 fresh U-boats to head for 56°N - 27°W had been interpreted to mean that a new group was forming in this area.1 This information was on hand by 2 March and was incorporated in a memorandum of that date to COMINCH with the statement that the new group would probably form by 5 March from approximately 56°N - 29°W to 53°N - 28°W. By 6 March it was known from traffic read that many additional fresh submarines had been given heading points in the same area and it was assumed that the line was being extended. The general arrangement was clear: a long westerly sweep group forming in mid-Atlantic to support Waldfang-Burggraf, whose composition and general location off Newfoundland were known. Actually Neuland U-boats with a total then of 17 members were ordered on 3 March to form by noon of the 7th from 54°45'N - 27°15'W to 51°N - 23°45'W. As further additions arrived the line was extended southward to 49° 45'N as well as northward. Contact on SC 121 by Hopmann had drawn off the northern half of the group before the U-boats could get in line. It was certainly reasonable to assume, as was done, that some of the U-boats, the northerly ones, in the mid-Atlantic concentration would close SC 121 and that the southern members would hold their line and carry out a westerly sweep. This split had taken place before, but it was not possible to fix the exact lines. Past experience had shown, however, that at this time no route north of 50°N could be regarded as safe unless every U-boat could be accounted for day by day and unless every patrol line was known to the last second of position and knot of sweeping speed. With the U-boat group pattern that was made clear in February, Command could cover every lane north of 50°N with his staggered sweeps. Even so he got contacts he had not counted on, for there was no way on either side of allowing for the element of chance. As it was, the convoy HX 228 almost cleared the Neuland concentration, and the escorts gave the U-boats some rough treatment."

Raubgraf-Stürmer-Dränger, convoys HX 229 and SC 122 surrounded.

The attack on HX 229 - SC 122 marks the high point of March convoy operations - in terms of number of U-boats, number of ship's sunk, and last but not least, in terms of German exploitation of their intelligence on convoys. The operation is discussed from the point of view of German intelligence in Volume III, Chapter IV, where the probable compromise of an early HX 229 diversion dispatch is examined.

U-boat group arrangement prior to contact.

Eleven Neuland U-boats turned back westward from their pursuit of HX 228 with orders to take up a reconnaissance line from 53°45'N - 37°55'W to 50°33'N - 36°15'W as group Dränger. At the same time U-boats to the north (approximately 25) including many from port, were forming group Strumer just west of 30°W and running from about 60°N down to the latitude of Dränger. With Raubgraf off Newfoundland the pattern was complete. Disappointed of HX 228, Raubgraf had turned its attention to ON 170 during the pause while the U-boats waited for the next eastbound convoy. Expected on 10 March, ON 170 had been delayed by bad weather and was not sighted until the 13th, when Bertelsmann (U-603) reported the convoy in 50°03'N - 44°25'W. The operation failed, contact not being maintained for anyone period long enough to permit successful attack. As the U-boats moved southwest looking for ON 170 they were informed of their next assignment: to form on the 15th across the route of a northeast bound convoy, HX 229. The timing and the location of the line were excellent.

Radio intelligence comment.

By March 13, Raubgrafs intentions against ON 170 were known from traffic. That the U-boats were moving southwest could be seen from D/F's as they attempted to operate. Hence the convoy diversion of 13 March was sound. The exact location of Stürmer and Dränger U-boats were not known but it was appreciated, again from headings of outbound U-boats and past behavior, that a powerful concentration was building up in the mid-Atlantic north of 50°N. What no one was prepared for at the moment was the sudden intrusion of German convoy intelligence which put Raubgraf at high speed on an interception course.

Contact established after extensive maneuvers.

At 1847A/14, before Raubgraf could take up the line ordered for the 15th, they were sent east southeast at high speed. The U-boats actually stopped short of intercepting HX 229 and were a little too far behind SC 122. They knew the convoy was there, but it was not until Feiler (U-653) ran into the convoy as he headed for a refueler off to the southeast that U-boats began to move with a final degree of assurance. Before Feiler found HX 229, a new Raubgraf line of nine U-boats was set up, to be in position by 1200/15 from 51° 15'N - 42°05'W to 49°27'N - 40°55'W "for an eastbound convoy to which further groups can later also be detailed." (1920/14) The line was shifted eastward slightly and, in order to make the search as comprehensive as possible, even damaged submarines were by every means possible to arrive in positions. "The convoy must be found." (0443/15) At noon the line was moved southward, patrolling on a southeast course, reversing to northeast at 1000/16 if no contact was made. As a result of Walkerling's (U-91) report of a destroyer and "suspected convoy" in 49°33'N- 40°35'W, three other U-boats were detailed to search with him, the remainder of the group moving eastward to form a new patrol line the following day from 51°15'N - 38°55'W to 49°21'N - 37°45'W. The first actual contact was that made in 49°27'N - 37°25'W by Feiler (U-653), who was directed to shadow until other Raubgraf U-boats could close in for the attack.

U-boats close from all directions.

An additional three U-boats were assigned to the convoy upon completion of refueling and the eleven U-boats which comprised the southern half of Stürmer were ordered to operate immediately, while the northern part of the group proceeded on a southeasterly course to circumvent any possible diversion. The 20 U-boats already operating searched for seven hours and found only an occasional steamer until Zurmtihlen (U-601) located the whole convoy again at 1506/16. However, he was immediately driven off by an escort. With so many U-boats in the vicinity of the convoy it was inevitable that contact should be resumed at once, this time by Kapitzky (U-605) who sent beacon signals until midnight. Raubgraf was reminded that:

"a good fix in that area is of the greatest importance because of the highly irregular currents at the junction of the Gulf Stream and the Labrador current. For that reason always report a new fix." (1628/16 March 1943)

The accuracy of Kapitzky's sighting reports and his beacon signals succeeded in homing about a dozen U-boats on HX 229 for the critical first night attack. Although four escort vessels had held the attackers at bay from the first sightings until darkness set in, they were hopelessly outnumbered thereafter; the wide convoy formation described by Feiler demanded an omnipresent escort, which was patently impossible.

U-boats run out of torpedoes. "The beginning was first class."

Bertelsmann (U-603) claimed to have made the first attack and when Walkerling (U-91) reported the sinking of two freighters he also reported that the convoy's defenses were apparently weak. After 0400/17 attack and success reports followed hard upon one another with Manseck (U-758) claiming four, Strelow (U-435) a probable three, and Zurmühlen (U-600) "left a 5,000 tonner burning briskly and sinking" (0630/17) after which he retired temporarily in order to send beacon signals. At 0905/17 Walkerling (U-91) reported from 50°51'N - 34°25'W "3 hits on 2 damaged ships. Still 3 large damaged ships remaining. Request (another) sub. Have no torpedoes left." Bertelsmann (U-603) was in the same plight an hour later, two damaged ships in sight and no torpedoes. To forestall any illusion that the success achieved thus far was all that would be required of the U-boats COMSUBs sent the following message: "The beginning was first class. Contact must not be allowed to be lost. Report immediately. At the same time report who has observations on composition and size of convoy..." (1005/17)

SC 122.

Previously, Kinzel (U-338) had reported a convoy in 51°57'N - 32°45'W. His insistence on the accuracy of the fix led COMSUBs to order the northern half of Stürmer to operate at maximum speed, on the assumption that this was a faster group detached from HX 229, it was later recognized as a second convoy.

U-boat saturation point.

With the battle in full swing a number of other U-boats, outbound to form Seeteufel, offered to join the slaughter but were told to continue their cruise, unless they stumbled on something too good to miss. A dispatch from Command at 1810/17 indicated that the U-boats already operating needed no assistance. Things were going very well indeed. "Out of a convoy bound for England which was apprehended on 16 March in naval square BD 10, up to now 12 ships of 77,500 tons have been sunk and 6 other ships torpedoed."

Convoy defenses.

Bahr's (U-305) sighting of a convoy in 52°21'N - 30o55'W at 1428/17 altered the previous assumption of a detachment from HX 229 to that of another convoy, which indeed it was SC 122. In addition to the northern Stürmer U-boats which had been ordered to operate on Kinzel's report, a similar part of Dränger was assigned. By this time however, very long range aircraft was available to provide some measure of protection for both convoys and its contribution was evident in the decreased number of attacks.

U-boat Command complains; U-boats begin to lag.

The seven escort vessels attached to SC 122 doubtless had some foreknowledge of the approaching situation, though they were unable to divert the convoy in time to prevent an attack. Consequently, the second night was by no means as fruitful as the first for the U-boats, so that COMSUBs admonished both groups:

"What is happening to the shadower reports? With such a large number of submarines contact must not be broken off. Sweep further at top speed. II (0402/18 March 1943)

*Freyberg (U-610) located HX 229 again and sent beacon signals for proceeding at top speed, but, before the group arrived on the scene, he was forced under by a destroyer. A straggler from the group, Schug (U-86), was criticized sharply:

"Your position 120 miles behind the convoy without enemy action can be explained only as absolute faulty operation. Pursue at top speed. II " (1757/18 March 1943)

The order was reiterated in the next message to Raubgraf and Stürmer:

"Every sub is expected to pursue at maximum speed in order to reach convoy. Search in long sweeps depending on condition of sea. With such a large number of submarines, more submarines should get there. We still have to give this convoy a drubbing." (1851/18 March 1943)

Wind up of the operation.

Until dusk on 18 March contact were few and then chiefly with escort vessels. By 1951 when Brosin (U-134) reported a slow convoy in wide formation in 53°27'N - 27°55'W the U-boats were running low on fuel and, in order to squeeze the last measure of success for this golden opportunity, COMSUBs directed them to:

"continue operation long enough so that tanker (Wolfbauer (0-463) in 48°57'N 33°15'W) will be reached with 5 cbm of fuel remaining. Subs which are very low in fuel and in especially good attack position use opportunities to the full. In case of necessity rendezvous will be moved north or another sub will be appointed to transfer its fuel to others." (2115/18 March 1943)

With renewed vigor the U-boats resumed the attack, but after Trojer (U-221) had sunk two ships, types Clan Mac Dougall and Salacia, he reported that the wide and close escort somehow become stronger in the interim. Again at 2240/18 Brosin sighted about 20 ships in 53°39'N - 27°35'W, speed 8, course 065°; however, the bright moonlight made it difficult for him to do more than shadow. The excellent visibility proved an advantage to the convoys for the U-boats were unable to maintain sustained contact during the rest of the night and by noon of the following day, the surface escort once more was supplemented by aircraft, the presence of which caused COMSUBs to say:

"In spite of aircraft try absolutely to get ahead, in order to be near the convoy when darkness falls. Take advantage of last chance tonight, since operation will be discontinued tomorrow at dawn." (1738/19 March 1943)

The attempts of the U-boats to comply were futile: Tippelskirch (U-439) reported Asdic pursuit and depth charge for eight hours, Loeser (U-373) complained that he was constantly being forced under by aircraft, Uhlig (U-527) echoed this complaint and Witermeyer (U-190) suffered ASDIC and depth charge pursuit for nine hours. Although all U-boats were instructed to:

"utilize chance for submerged day attack on morning of 20. Thereafter break up and sweep for single ships in large area to SW on path of convoy." (2232/19 March 1943)

they had already fallen too far behind both convoys to permit further operations. As one U-boat after another reported the convoy out of reach, by tacit consent activity gradually ceased.

Conclusion: "despite strong air and surface defense," the "greatest success."

During the course of the three day attack on HX 229 and SC 122, the majority of the U-boats in the North Atlantic participated. Their disposition before the first sighting and the extent of the battle as regards time and area made it possible for approximately 40 U-boats to engage in the operation. They were available in sufficient numbers at the right time and place. After one group had attacked and fallen behind, the next group was in a position to take up the battle. Furthermore, as the convoy advanced, the inadequacy of its escort forced it to abandon damaged ships, leaving them like so many sitting ducks for the U-boats which had fallen behind. The escorts were outnumbered two to one, as they had been in the case of SC 121 and HX 228. Due to the factors already mentioned plus weather, advantageous to U-boat operations, the toll of ships sunk was 21, 13 from HX 229 and eight from SC 122. In consequence, U-boats received the following commendation:

"Appreciation and recognition for the, greatest success yet achieved against a convoy. After the extraordinary, successful surprise blow on the first night, tough and energetic pursuit, despite strong air and surface defense, brought splendid successes to the submarines in their attacks both night and day." (1036/21 March 1943)

*Baron Walter von Freyberg-Eisenberg-Allmendingen. A name I came to loathe.

 

[Norumbega]

Cont'd

There's not much that I know about "the Baron", but I sometimes wonder with that particular title if he were not a descendant from a family of nobility somewhere in Germany---not that it matters. During the bio dig I have come across various bits of information. In searching one German aristocracy website, I found listed his birth date as 1915, making him 28 years old as the Kapitan of the U-610. Apparently, a bit of aryan blue blood did flow through his veins. I also found another with the same last name, first name being Egloff, who was a Major General, born in 1883 who lived to be 99, subsequently dying in 1984. I'm not sure if this may have been his father. Apparently his portrait hangs in Kurzvita(?)

*Walter von Freyberg was born in Geisenheim, Rheingau. He joined the German Navy in 1935, serving as the Assistant Damage Control Officer in the heavy cruiser Blucher when the war began. He was aboard her when she was sunk in Oslo Fjord on April 9, 1940. Freyberg transferred to the uboats in April and after conversion training, served as the first Watch Officer in the type VIIC boat U-502 from December 19, 1940 to June 1941. U-502 at that time was commanded by the third highest uboat scoring ace of the war, OltZs Erich Topp, Knights Cross recipient with Oak Leaves and Swords (35 ships sunk, 4 damaged). Freyberg was selected for command and underwent his U-boats commander's course from June to July of 1941. He was appointed to command the Type VIIC training boat U-52 on July of 1941. On February 19, 1942 KptLt Freiher von Freyberg-Eisenberg--Allmindengen was appointed to commission U-610. He would be her only C.O.

*Information from: www.seawaves.com

As was mentioned earlier, von Freyberg commanded a type VIIC uboat, which was built at the Blohm & Vos shipyard, Hamburg. This type of submarine was the workhorse of the German uboat force. From 1940-1945 over 568 were commissioned.
They were a slightly modified version of the successful VIIB possessing similar engines and power, but being slightly heavier, were slower than the "B". They carried the same torpedo tube arrangement as their predecessors, which carried two bow tubes and a stern tube.
For surface cruising the U-610 was powered with two supercharged Germaniawerft, 6 cylinder, 4-stroke M6V 40/46 diesels totalling between 2,800-3,200 bhp(2,400kw) at 470 to 490 rpm. Regarding submerged propulsion, several different electrical engines were used. As an aside, probably the most famous notable of this style of uboat will be remembered in the film Das Boat, (U-96).

U-610 left Kiel on Sept. 12, 1942 arriving at St. Nazaire on Oct. 31, 1942 after seven weeks. On it's first maiden patrol, U-610 hit two ships in separate convoys, sinking the British ship Lifland in SC-101 and American ship Steel Navigator, a member of convoy ON-137. During it's second patrol lasting 5 weeks, it hit two more ships, sinking the Norwegian ship Bello, part of convoy ON-153 on Dec. 16, '42 and damaging the British Regent Lion, part of convoy ON-153.

von Freyberg's third active patrol, which departed on March 8, 1943 from St. Nazaire would tragically impact one American family in Charlton, Massachusettes. Time was running out for the SS William P. Frye.

Anyone who studies the logistical side of warfare, particularly the sheer weight of materiel produced by America for it's fighting men and her allies during WW2 still find it astounding. From a maritime perspective, shipbuilding yards were turning out freighters and liberty ships on a massive scale.
At the beginning of the war, it took approximately 230 man days to build a cargo ship, but as they came up to speed the total time was reduced to just 42 days. The record was the Robert E. Peary, taking just 4 days and 15 hours. The ships were being built assembly line style from prefabricated sections, which meant that three completed ships were being turned out every single day. They weren't without their problems however.
Early liberty ships suffered hull and deck cracks and a few were lost to structural defects. During WWII there were close to 1,500 significant brittle fractures and at least nineteen ships broke in half without warning. After this series of complex problems researchers found out that it was not from the welds as first suspected but due instead to the grade of steel which cause "embrittlement", which was made more manifest among the ships travelling the North Atlantic where extremes in temperature caused the steel to change from ductile to brittle.
Other existing problems dealt with engineering issues such as the alignment of the shafts and propellers to alignment of the reduction gears and the main shaft. It was one of these types of mechanical failures which caused the SS William P. Frye to first straggle, then drop out of convoy HX-230.

As I'd stated at the beginning, the specualtion and stories that my family and I have heard, and certainly never denied by Mystic Steamship Co. were manyfold. I had been given to understand growing up that the Wm. P. Frye dropped out due to sabotage(myth #1). However, in running down sources over the years I have found that this explanation was patently untrue. The Frye broke down due to mechanical failure. Fortunately for the ship, which had begun experiencing mechanical failure sometime on 3-28, and while hove to trying to make repairs, were under the cover of a storm that had gone from a gale to what has been described by both the convoy and the wolfpacks as "hurricane force".
Yet, as monumental as the storm was, it did not prevent one uboat from group Seewolf who was tracking the convoy, from firing a spread of torpedoes at the S.S Frye, which missed .
Group Seeteufel in the meatime had been instructed to break off it's operation against a SW convoy and converge on HX-230.
It should also be noted here that on March 28, not one of the uboats had been able to maintain contact with this convoy due to the tenacity of the attack by the support group of SC-123 which had been detatched the previous day.
Aggressively using depth charges, the uboats were kept off the convoy. Unfortunately, the Frye was outside the protective ring though attempting to make up lost time due to the heroic efforts of the engineers (my grandfathers group) who were able to make repairs and get the ship underway again sometime during the afternoon of March 29.

While not able to maintain flank speed, the Frye was able to maintain a steady 12.5 knots as it broke into a defensive zig-zag course. It wasn't necessarily fast, but it was enough to outdistance this trailing uboat as the afternoon light began to fade. In the end however, they were merely buying time. U-610 was already on station on the starboard side.

There is something monumentally horrific about seeing a ship go down, regardless of the method or occasion.
According (I'm assuming) to the log book from the U-610, a torpedo struck the S.S. William P Frye at 23:36 hours, blasting into #1 hold. Fortune held for a brief few moments as the hold, filled with wheat for the UK, cushioned and absorbed the blast. However, just four minutes later at 23:40 hours a coup de grace was fired that struck just forward of amidships. It was at this time that I believe my grandfathers life came to an end. As the 2nd Assistant Engineer, his place was in the engineroom providing watchover on their mechanical problem. He wasn't up on the deck smoking his pipe as our family had been lead to believe(myth #2). He met his fate in the engine room and I have prayed since that as his true circumstance came to light that it was mercifully quick as the Atlantic blew in.

Through research and pure serendipty I found one of the two naval armed guard survivors from the Wm. P. Frye, who went on to shatter another myth. One of his first comments to me during our phone conversation was that the "ship went down so fast that I barely had time to get my leg over the rail."
U-610's log bears this out reporting that the ship went down by the bow in approximately 5 minutes. My source also stated that there were no life boats that got lowered per the reports(myth 3), which stated that one had been lowered with crew aboard, although they were never seen again. Further debunking this, using reports from other sources, the hurricane had been so severe that many of the boats had been wrecked or washed over the side along with the exception of one. Any lifeboats remaining could not be lowered because of the fact that the boat davit ropes had been knotted and tossed up over the rail to keep them up out of the way. He said that they couldn't have untied the knots in time to lower the boats.

It is hard for me to imagine what it was like during the inky blackness of a storm tossed night, knowing that your ship is pointed downward and that you have no alternative but to jump over the side in gale force winds, knowing that:
a). It is March in the North Atlantic and the water is going to hit you like ice.
b). You can't see at all save what the oil fire illuminates. You wonder as you leap if there will be some kind of flotsam to grab on to, and whether or not you'll be capable of holding on after a few icy minutes.

But this Naval gunner did.....as did his buddy, gunner Blackie Bauer. Both men, as well as the Chief Engineer, a radioman, and three Philippino stewards made their way to the sole LCT that hadn't washed overboard, but which had broken free during the explosion. Hauling themselves aboard, the 7 men would do their best to stay warm for the next six days before being spotted by HMS Shikari D85, which ironically earlier in the war, had been the last warship to pick up survivors from the beaches of Dunkirk.

Enter Ensign Carl S. Dalby Jr. Sadly, his heroics are unknown to history, yet I know him through the scrapbook that my father gave me. I'd like to re-introduce him for the first time in 64 years.

From the news clipping:
"Honoring the man who stayed at his radio post sending SOS calls for seven of the eight minutes his ship was afloat after it was twice torpedoed, the war shipping administration has awarded a posthumous commission of ensign to Carl S. Dalby. The story of Dalby's bravery was told to his parents who returned Sunday from New York to Boston where they went to talk to survivors of the crew of 66. The convoy with which Dalby was traveling lacked only a few hours of it's destination when it developed engine trouble. It was one of the new Liberty vessels and was making it's first crossing.
When the engine went bad the Liberty vessel had to drop back. In three or four hours the engine was repaired and the ship had just started up, full speed ahead, to try to join the convoy, when a submarine surfaced. Young Dalby radioed ahead to the convoy. Merchant Marinemen at their battle stations tried to get range on the boat but high waves made a direct hit impossible. The submarine submerged when fired on which meant Dalbey's vessel had a chance to run ahead as the speed of a submerged submarine is less than that of the new vessels. However, the submarine radioed ahead to companion ships in the water, to head that way and surround the boat. Not long after that, the first torpedo crashed into the stern of the United States vessel, but did not sink it. For minutes later there was a direct hit amidships and the vessel began to go down rapidly.
Dalbey stayed at his post in the radio room sending his call over and over. Then as the whole deck was awash he left the radio room and brought out a portable emergency radio. The barges lashed to the deck had gone overboard in the storm and the crackup( explosion?). Only one remained. Dalbey was hanging on to the side trying to fasten the radio down when a wave 30 or 40 feet high capsized the small craft. Dalbey was not seen again according to Ensign Benjamin Barrett of East Boston.
Barrett and his six companions managed to find the barge and climbed aboard. For five days and six nights, they kept afloat with no water and five carrots for food."

Again, the news article is at certain odds with facets of various reports, but the gist is there. The news article went on to state that they were able to start a small fire in the engine room of the barge with small wood scraps. They were eventually rescued on the sixth morning although the sea was still running high.
The Shikuri had heard Dalbey's SOS and they were out looking for survivors. The survivors in turn were dropped off in Londonderry, Ireland before being shipped back to New York. My contact (survivor) said that he got separated from his buddy Blackie Bauer and never knew what happened to him, nor did he ever receive any explanation surrounding the sinking.

Back at St. Nazaire, U-610's victory dance was short lived.

October of that year would find the Coastal Command, a UK based flying squadron, very busy flying seaward to provide protective cover for incoming convoys beginning their second half of the inbound leg.
A wind of change was beginning toward the latter part of 1943. Strategies were evolving which were providing huge dividends in the convoy wars. One of those was the use of the Sunderland aircraft: http://www.odyssey.dircon.co.uk/Sunderland.htm.

One of those squadrons posted within the British Coastal Command, and stationed at Castle Archdale on Lower Lough Erne, N. Ireland was DD863 of squadron 423 RCAF. On 8 October they were flying the Sunderland MarkIII which was then beginning to run low on fuel. Having reached the end of the patrol limit they had banked about and were flying in the rear of convoy SC-143. They were near the end of their fuel limit. Below them in the distance, a blip lit up on radar suddenly appeared. U-610, which had been stalking SC-143 was lying on the surface. The Sunderland had become alerted.
The Canadian crew aboard the Sunderland that day included:
F/O (Flying Officer) A.H. Russell
F/O A. Menaul
W/C Frizzle
F/O H. Forrest
Sgt. W. Alexander
Sgt. R. Locke
Sgt. W. Lanchaster
Sgt. Bromhead
W/O F. Harr
Sgt. D. Douglas
Sgt. A. Caterham

According to one of the AAR reports:
"The aircraft was on patrol astern of SC-143, having joined the convoy at 17:34 hours. Two hours later they located U-610 on the surface. They over flew her and opened fire with machine guns, U-610 replied in kind. W/C Frizzle was in the pilot's seat. He handed it over to Bert Russell who, on the run dropped 4 depth charges, one of which hung up.
Two of the D.C.'s straddled the submarine which was lifted from the water, she sank leaving debris and oil on the surface. This was her 5th patrol.
Russell was awarded the DFC for his attack.
Harry Forrest was manning the bow machine gun positon and told me that he would always remember and could never forget the faces of the German sailors when they flew over, the white faces looking up at them. Time of patrol, 10:27-02:43 hrs.
I am having trouble confirming it, but it was stated in another RCAF report that they had thrown a buoyancy device to them and that they were picked up. I'm not sure I trust the veracity of this statement, and it would require additional research to verify it.

Luck had run out for the U-610. Below are listed the crew:
Name Rank Born Died

Badersbach Ernst OFkMt 17.09.1917 08.10.1943
Bensemann Walter-Otto BtsMt 10.02.1919 08.10.1943
Böhme Ernst OMasch 28.02.1918 08.10.1943
Clausen Karl-Heinz Mtr 26.09.1921 08.10.1943
Deubel Friedrich OMaschMt 17.09.1915 08.10.1943
Essl Rudolf OGfr 04.10.1923 08.10.1943
Feldmann Hans-August OGfr 13.03.1923 08.10.1943
Franzkowiak Gerd MaschOGfr 27.06.1922 08.10.1943
Freyberg-Eisenberg von Walter KpLt 05.11.1915 08.10.1943 U-552. 1WO.(12.40-06.41). U-52. Cdr.(07.41-01.42). U-610+ Cdr.(02.42-10.43)
birthplace Geisenheim
lost N.Atlantic
serial/entry Crew of 1935
awards DKiG. 08.10.43.(U-610).
Frommelt Heinz MechMt 19.12.1919 08.10.1943
Gerding Bernhard BtsMt 01.10.1921 08.10.1943
Gosch Werner OMaschMt 09.09.1920 08.10.1943
Grade Walter OFkMt 20.06.1920 08.10.1943 U-610+
Gruschow Hans MtrOGfr 15.01.1922 08.10.1943
Gunkel Heinz MaschOGfr 06.05.1923 08.10.1943
Habig Dr. Herbert Mar.butt.Arzt 15.09.1914 08.10.1943
Hahn Werner StOMasch 10.04.1911 08.10.1943
Haprich Herbert MtrOGfr 23.12.1923 08.10.1943
Hartmann Joachim OMaschMt 28.07.1917 08.10.1943
Hartmann Werner MtrOGfr 06.04.1924 08.10.1943
Hechler Fritz ObGfr 03.10.1923 08.10.1943
Heimburger Hermann MaschOGfr 06.03.1920 08.10.1943
Höhne Heinz MaschOGfr 11.04.1923 08.10.1943
lost W.S.W.of Rockall
Kastner Heinz MtrGfr 30.06.1923 08.10.1943
Kemper Reinhold MaschOGfr 27.05.1923 08.10.1943
Krause Karl-Franz OMasch 20.07.1916 08.10.1943
Liebetrau Gunther MechGfr 21.09.1924 08.10.1943
Lemke, Siegfried Obgfr. 30.08.1923 08.10.1943
Luther Wilfried OLt.ing 28.09.1919 08.10.1943 U-757. U-610
serial/entry Crew of 1938
Merettig Horst ObGfr 13.11.1923 08.10.1943
Moritz Gerhard OGfr 18.05.1922 08.10.1943
lost W.S.W.of Rockall
Naue Herbert ObGfr 06.07.1922 08.10.1943
Nicolas Horst ObGfr 06.09.1922 08.10.1943
Nixdorf Heinz Lt.z.S U-610
Petruschke Bernhard Gfr 08.06.1924 08.10.1943
Pyko Kurt ObGfr 19.12.1923 08.10.1943
Reinhardt Rudolf OStrm 14.07.1914 08.10.1943
Reining Walter ObGfr 24.06.1922 08.10.1943
Rutz Günther ObGfr 07.03.1923 08.10.1943
Scharke Gerhard ObGfr 23.08.1922 08.10.1943
Schecht Ewald ObGfr 26.06.1923 08.10.1943
Scheitza Bernhard Mt 25.09.1920 08.10.1943
Schröder Gustav ObMt 13.03.1914 08.10.1943
Springer Willi ObGfr 26.02.1922 08.10.1943
Teipel Hans Lt.z.S 06.06.1911 08.10.1943
Tholl Paul ObGfr 11.10.1919 08.10.1943
lost W.S.W.of Rockall
Tiedemann Alfred OLt.z.S 25.03.1915 08.10.1943
Walther Fritz Gfr 03.03.1921 08.10.1943
Weitz Friedrich OLt.z.S 18.04.1920 02.05.1944 "U-610.1WO.02.42-05.43. U-959+ Cdr26.07.43-02.05.44. Before on Cruiser ""Leipzig"" 03.41-07.41."
birthplace Essen
lost S.E.of Jan Mayen
serial/entry Crew of 1938
Werner Ernst ObGfr 01.03.1924 08.10.1943
Wettig Fritz Gfr 24.04.1924 08.10.1943
Winkelmann Paul-Gerhard Lt.z.S 04.07.1923 08.10.1943
serial/entry Crew of X/1940
Wuschko Ernst ObGfr 26.12.1923 08.10.1943


Tragedy did not always happen in combat.

Two months later on 5 December the air crew were "collared" leaving the mess hall and asked to make a routine flight over to Stranraer, Scotland.
There were about 18-20 on board, probably most if not all going on leave and stealing a ride to make it down to London quickly rather than waste a half day on the trains and ferry. Tragedy struck when along the route they flew into a mountain in County Antrim overlooking the coastal town of Ballcastle. One report states that 9 died in the crash.
Bert Russell, DFC recipient just two months earlier was court martialed as were one or two other crewmembers.......some doubts were cast on the airworthiness of the aircraft.

Conclusion
My attempts are to highlight the victories and tragedy's of the Battle of the North Atlantic and to bring light to bear on an oft overlooked, yet critical part of Victory Europe. The details speak for themselves, but my grandfathers story and his sacrifice is part of a larger heroic story of the men who provided the means to an end. It would not have happened without them.
God bless them all. Our country may not recognize them for what they truly were and are, but those of us who are Gold Star families have never forgotten, nor will we ever.

Below are listed the KIA of the William P. Frye. Were it in my power to do so, I would have gladly added the members of the Naval Armed Guard. At present it is beyond my ability, not having those records.

Honored dead of the SS William P. Frye

Octavio Alvarez
William H Ambler
Carl L Anderson
Oscar Anderson
Charles A Arsenault
Harry G Atkins
Arthur E Atwood
Sherman L Barnes
Leslie N Barry
Holman S Bell
Roland A Bourque
Nicholas P Brock
William M Broderson
James T Bunell
Russell Howard Bush
George H Campbell
Manuel Catorro
Marcus C Cavanaugh
Avilino Chor
Robert J Cole
Howard M Coppedge
Arthur G Corea
Manuel Correira
Henry Francis Czupailo
Alfred G Dagenais
Carl S Dalbey Fr.
Roger I Decker
John D Diamond
Frank S D'Lorenzo
Francis Duffy
Arthur S Embree
Gerard Finn
George A Foley
Charles J Franz
Ernest A french
Adelino Gaspar
Ray A Gunter
William Hagbourne
James J Hanley
Robert M Hawthorn
William J Herlihy
Harold G Hiltz
Walter P Hopkins
Walter F Howe
EdmundJ Irvin
Arthur E Iverson
Frank A Ivone Fr.
Francis M Janowich
John S Jaslowich
Joseph W Kennis Jr.
John Kirby
Vincent A Kirk
Sophus L Larsen
Benedict Lipskas
John Dos Santos Lopes
John J Lynch
Forrest S MacNeill
John C Marks
Juan S Martinez
William J McHale
Nicholas L McLean
Lee H Meacham
Milton Milkvy
Rutledge L Miller
Lloyd S Minninger Jr.
Gerald J Mitchell
Dana R Mulvey
Leslie G Neal
Victor Ortiz
Antonio Paskowski
Vincenzo Patrinzi
Robert J Peters
John Poore
Jospeh Puorro
Albert E Purrington
Lincoln D Remick
Meinhard Scherf
Charles C Serra
Bernard M Sheehan
Anthony J Shulditski
Henry E Souza
Patrick F Sparrow
Thomas E Spear
Donald E Sprague
Lawrence T Sullivan
Leon H Thomas
Ciriaco Tubilleja
George N Tzirvilakis
Morris F Valentine
William E Vonberg
Raymond C Wagner
Oscar C Wahlberg
John W Weeks
Joseph P Weetman

Semper Fi,
Alan

 

[dhermann1]

This certainly belongs in the All Time Great Fedora Lounge Threads. Thanks so much for contributing this fascinating, detailed and extremely moving account. If you're ever in New York, there is a really terrific memorial to those who lost their lives in the Battle of the Atlantic down at Battery Park, at the very southern tip of Manhattan.
Again, thanks for this great thread.

 

[Norumbega]

I am humbled and I'm glad it was worthy of the time it took to read it. Again apologizies for the length.
One thing I didn't provide were photos from the scrapbook I have that had belonged to my grandmother. I have a few of my grandfather on deck a merchant vessel and in the USN during WWI, one of the S.S. Wm. Frye tied up at the pier at New England Shipbuilding in So. Portland, and several off a disc, sent to me by a former USN officer, now living in Canada of the U-610 under attack just previous to it's sinking. The photos were taken by what I assume was another patrol craft.
My goal is to save my money and contact the uboat museum in Cux, Germany to research photo's and documentation on the U-610 and it's crew.

For those who would like to further their understanding of the uboat war, I highly recommend: http://www.uboat.net

Again, thank you all for your forebearance, I know it was lengthy.

 

[Norumbega]

Sometimes I forget that probably most individuals are not aware how the convoy system was designated during WWII. For a greater understanding I'll print this up with recognition going to Uboat.net, which carries it on their wonderful website.

Convoy routes

More than 200 convoy-routes existed in the war, here we show most of the routes which U-boats attacked, from here you can go to every convoy-route to see all the attacked convoys and some details.

Each convoy was known by two or more letters, usual meaning the the departure and destination harbours, i.e. the AB convoys sailed from Aden to Bombay and BA convoys returned from Bombay to Aden. But also were used the H for Home and the O for Outward, i.e. HX meant for \'Home from Halifax\'. The lettering was also used to indicate the convoy's speed. The HX-convoys were allways fast ones and the SC's were slow ones.

The convoys received a number when they left the harbour, like BA-2 or HX-348, some convoys ended up with a number over 100 like the HX, SC, ON and OB convoys.

Code Route Area
AS USA - Freetown Central Atlantic
BC Beira, Mozambique - Capetown, South Africa Indian Ocean
BD Archangel'sk - Dikson (Soviet coastal convoy) Arctic Ocean
BRN Brazilian coastal convoys South Atlantic
BS Brest - Casablanca (France) North Atlantic
BT Bahia, Brazil - Trinidad South Atlantic / Caribbean
BTC UK coastal convoys
BX Boston - Halifax North Atlantic
CB Colombo, Sri Lanka - Bombay, India Indian Ocean
CD Capetown - Durban Indian Ocean
CU Caribbean - United Kingdom Central Atlantic
DN Durban - North
EBC English Channel
FN Freetown - Natal (?)
FS Methil - Southend
GTX Gibraltar - Tripoli - Alexandria Mediterranean
HG Gibraltar - UK
HX Halifax/ New York - UK North Atlantic
JT Rio de Janeiro, Brazil - Trinidad Central Atlantic
JW Loch Ewe, UK - Kola Fjord, Russia Arctic Ocean
KB Kola Fjord - White Sea (Soviet) Arctic Ocean
KMF UK - Mediterranean (fast)
KMS UK - Mediterranean (slow) North Atlantic
MH UK coastal
MKF Mediterranean - UK (fast)
OA Southend - Outward (N.-America)
OB Liverpool - Outward (North America) North Atlantic
OG United Kingdom - Gibraltar North Atlantic
OS UK - Freetown
PK Petsamo (Kirkenes) - Kola Fjord Arctic Ocean
PQ Iceland - Russia Arctic Ocean
QP Russia - Iceland Arctic Ocean
RA Kola Fjord, Russia - Loch Ewe, UK Arctic Ocean
RU Reykjavik - UK North Atlantic
SC Sydney - UK
SL Sierra Leone (Freetown) - UK
TBC UK coastal
TE
TS Takoradi - Freetown West Africa
UR UK - Reykjavik North Atlantic

This is currently not a complete list of all routes used by convoys. On this page you can see a list of all convoys we know to have been hit by U-boats.

 

[kampkatz]

Thanks,Norumbega, for the education. The details that you gave about convoys aren't normally seen in documentaries.

 

[Corky]

I got my Z card on the day I turned 18.

Z1213983

Too bad the American Merchant Marine got sold off to Aristotle Onassis and his pals back in the '50s and '60s.

 

[Fletch]

1 in 26 mariners serving aboard merchant ships in World WW II died in the line of duty, suffering a greater percentage of war-related deaths than all other U.S. services. Casualties were kept secret during the War to keep information about their success from the enemy and to attract and keep mariners at sea.

An added benefit for the government - and misfortune for MMs - was that they were not eligible for any military benefits after the war. This situation, not surprisingly, wasn't corrected until most of the WW2 vets were gone.

Adding insult to injury, the secrecy policy caused widespread resentment of MMs as combat-dodging cowards, on the part of both the Navy and the public.

 

[Story]

An added benefit for the government - and misfortune for MMs - was that they were not eligible for any military benefits after the war. This situation, not surprisingly, wasn't corrected until most of the WW2 vets were gone. Adding insult to injury, the secrecy policy caused widespread resentment of MMs as combat-dodging cowards, on the part of both the Navy and the public.

Yup, heard those stories firsthand.

Also heard accounts of crews that made it off of torpedoed freighters in the North Atlantic, only to pass into oblivion because the rest of the convoy couldn't stop for them (for fear of being caught like a sitting duck).

This stunning memorial was dedicated October 8, 1991 and depicts merchant mariners in a sinking lifeboat. The placque dedictaes the statue to merchant mariners lost at sea.
Fabricator/Sculptor: Marisol Escobar

From
http://theweblicist.com/wordpress/c...monuments/american-merchant-marines-memorial/

And further, on MM heros :
Feb 6, 2009
New members honored in National Maritime Hall of Fame
http://www.marinelog.com/DOCS/NEWSMMIX/2009feb00061.html

Francis Dales was a U.S. Merchant Marine Academy midshipmen assigned in 1942 to the SS SANTA ELISA for sea training. His vessel was selected to be part of a convoy to re-supply the island of Malta, a convoy that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill ordered to "get through at all costs." At the time, British-held Malta, with its small but effective air and submarine force, greatly disrupted Axis efforts to supply German and Italian forces in North Africa.

The Malta convoy was under heavy Axis attack the moment it entered the Mediterranean. Dales' vessel, SANTA ELISA, was quickly sunk by an enemy torpedo boat, and Dales was rescued by a British destroyer.

Another vessel in the convoy, SS OHIO, with its most vital cargo of aviation fuel for Malta, was also hit and barely afloat. Two British destroyers lashed themselves to either side of the tanker to keep the vessel afloat and moving.

Dales was one of five seamen who volunteered to go aboard the abandoned and badly damaged OHIO to man her guns.

The OHIO was incessantly attacked for the remainder of the voyage. Wave after wave of enemy bombers dived on the vessel, two crashing into her decks. Bombs blew off her rudder and created a gaping hole in her side. Dales nonetheless resolutely manned his anti-aircraft gun, and in fierce action, helped keep the attacking aircraft and torpedo boats at bay as much as possible. The OHIO eventually limped into Malta with its vital cargo of fuel that would keep the island alive and fighting.

Dales received the Merchant Marine Distinguished Service Medal for his "heroism beyond the call of duty" aboard the OHIO.

*
The National Maritime Hall of Fame is open to visitors during the regular visiting hours of the American Merchant Marine Museum: Tuesday through Friday from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. For more information about the museum, call: (516) 773-5515

 

[Norumbega]

I neglected to add this. Truth is indeed stranger than fiction. I'm not sure how many of you suffered through my story above, but I thought those of you who have sailed the seas know of it's superstitions. I think all I can say is that, in this instance, it was all in a name. From History.com

January 28, 1915
Germans sink American merchant ship
In the country’s first such action against American shipping interests on the high seas, the captain of a German cruiser orders the destruction of the William P. Frye, an American merchant ship.

The William P. Frye, a four-masted steel barque built in Bath, Maine, in 1901 and named for the well-known Maine senator William Pierce Frye (1830-1911), was on its way to England with a cargo of wheat. On January 27, it was intercepted by a German cruiser in the South Atlantic Ocean off the Brazilian coast and ordered to jettison its cargo as contraband. When the American ship’s crew failed to fulfill these orders completely by the next day, the German captain ordered the destruction of the ship.

As the first American merchant vessel lost to Germany’s aggression during the Great War, the William P. Frye incident sparked the indignation of many in the United States. The German government’s apology and admission of the attack as a mistake did little to assuage Americans’ anger, which increased exponentially when German forces torpedoed and sank the British-owned ocean liner Lusitania on May 7, 1915, killing more than 1,000 people, including 128 Americans. The U.S., under President Woodrow Wilson, demanded reparations and an end to German attacks on all unarmed passenger and merchant ships. Despite Germany’s initial assurances to that end, the attacks continued.

In early February 1917, when Germany announced a return to unrestricted submarine warfare, the U.S. broke off diplomatic relations with the country. By the end of March, Germany had sunk several more passenger ships with Americans aboard and Wilson went before Congress to ask for a declaration of war on April 2, which was made four days later. The first American ships arrived in Europe within a week, marking a decisive end to U.S. neutrality.

 

[WW2XL]

US Navy Armed Guard

During both WWI & WWII, the US Navy placed armaments and gun crews to man them on merchant ships. They were known as the US Naval Armed Guard. These navy gunners served on Liberty Ships , Victory ships and all types of merchant vessels. My father served in the Armed Guard in North Atlantic, ETO, Persian Gulf, Med and Indian Ocean. It is a fact that anytime an enemy aircraft approached or attacked, the Merchant Crew received a cash bonus. The navy gun crews who manned the guns and engaged in combat received nothing. Not to denigrate our fine Merchant Seamen, but nonetheless a fact. The US Navy Armed Guard is among the foremost of unsung, forgotten heroes.

 

[Story]

My father served in the Armed Guard in North Atlantic, ETO, Persian Gulf, Med and Indian Ocean. .

What ships, what dates?

You might find these sites interesting -
http://www.armed-guard.com/
http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq104-1.htm

 

[Chas]

My dad, Leading Coder H.D. Burnham, was a Battle Of The Atlantic vet. He saw plenty of combat, talked very, very little about it until the last couple of years of his life. He was a signalman and for a time worked at a HF/DF station in Newfoundland, and at NDHQ in Quebec City. He shared a few memories, some quite traumatic. He did tell me once about a convoy he was on that was attacked by the Germans using guided bombs in the Bay Of Biscay. He served on HMCS Moosejaw, HMCS Huntsville and HMCS Saskatoon.

What he retained was a love of the ships, the sea and salmon fishing. Some of my fondest memories of childhood are a result of his sharing these passions with his family,

 

[Story]

A U.S. Navy patrol boat sunk during WWII has been found and photographed 20 miles off Cape Hatteras, N.C.

The wreck of the YP-389, a converted fishing trawler, rests in about 300 feet of water in a region known as the "Graveyard of the Atlantic," where several U.S. and British naval vessels, merchant ships, and German U-boats sunk during the Battle of the Atlantic.

Six sailors died when the YP-389 was attacked by a German submarine June 19, 1942. There were 18 survivors.

The research mission was led by NOAA.

The relatively intact remains of the YP-389 rest upright on the ship's keel, NOAA said in a statement this week. The wreck site is home to a variety of marine life. Much of the outer-hull plating has fallen away, leaving only the intact frames exposed.

http://www.livescience.com/history/090910-navy-yp-389-found.html

 

[The Lonely Navigator]

It's nice to see a thread on this.

Back in August, on the 22, I had gone to Philly to eat on the Moshulu (ex Kurt) and then stop and tour the USS New Jersey.

I happened to notice a Merchant Marine memorial that I took photos of and below that is one of the USS New Jersey:

I know that is on it's side.

 

[Naphtali]

My Father was in the Merchant Marine during WWII. Somewhere around here I have his papers. They include his license, rating card, and some doccuments from the various ships on which he served. Even thought he was from the west coast, he did all of his service in the Atlantic. He was on one ship that was sunk by u-boat attack but he would never talk about it. Must have been pretty awful.

My uncle Mike was a merchant mariner on the Murmansk run. When growing up I had a neat-o winter hat. For years I thought it was Russian army winter hat. During a taped interview in the early 1980s with my parents and Tom Gettemeyer in Florida, where my parents reminisced about the war and war years, I found out that the "Russian" hat was a Wehrmacht Peltzmutz.
***
Parenthetically, I've always hoped members of the Fedora Lounge would collect audio reminiscences, such as I have, into CDs/DVDs available to all members. By way of example, I just completed creating TIFF archives, JPEGs for online viewing, and high resolution PDF files for transferring via CD-Rs of the life's work of Golden Age gun designer John Sweany (on behalf of his close friend John Deutenberg).

 

[Story]

Back in August, on the 22, I had gone to Philly to eat on the Moshulu (ex Kurt) and then stop and tour the USS New Jersey.

And you didn't let all of us down here know!?!?!

Article on a fellow's visit to the S.S. Lane Victory, a West-Coast berthed Victory Ship. Yeah, I know, thread is on the Battle of the Atlantic but our west coast members might want to check this out.
http://www.the-signal.com/news/article/18916/

See also
http://www.thefedoralounge.com/showthread.php?p=881598#post881598

 

[The Lonely Navigator]

Nope...I didn't.

I can start a new thread in this section on it.

I had also stopped to check the Becuna which was a US WWII Sub (and much different from our U-Boats I might add!).

I do have more photos of the USS New Jersey.

I was preoccupied with that ship mainly because my one reenacting/living history friend was in the Navy in Vietnam and saw her firing her stern guns in the South China Seas during that war.

Will post more in the new thread on it...and some more photos.

 

[Corto]

Thanks for this great Merchant Marine thread. I always enjoy learning more about these men and how they served.

I had a Great Uncle who served with the Merchant Marine during WWII. I think he was killed by in the Pacific theater by a submarine attack. My mother tells me his death was extremely traumatic and had wide-ranging emotional reprecussions for the family, but whose combat death doesn't have that effect...

Thanks for all the research and info. Fascinating stuff.